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ABSTRACT OF CAPSTONE

OUTBREAK SEVERITY INDEX

Outbreaks are emergency situations that carry hazards of death, disability,
loss of home and property, and variety of other calamities. With technological
advancement, not only people and commodities are easy to transfer but also
disease outbreaks. However, outbreaks are dealt with by different countries
based on the differences in their healthcare systems and their ability to achieve
effective control of the outbreak. SARS, MERS, and Ebola are example of such
outbreaks that traveled around the globe and successful control was different
according to the virulence of outbreak agent and to the effectiveness of local
health system control measures. This capstone project proposes an outbreak
severity index as an outbreak evaluation tool. The aim of the evaluation tool is to
examine the severity of any emerging outbreak and to coordinate prevention and
control efforts accordingly both locally and globally. Application of the outbreak
severity index of SARS, MERS, and Ebola demonstrates that the score for
SARS, MERS, and Ebola are 5.42, 5.36, and 5.0 respectively on a 10.0 points
scale. This result indicates that SARS, MERS, and Ebola are moderate severe

	
  

	
  

outbreaks. With this result, public health practitioners have an objective
measurement tool to advocate for allocation of resources and for justifying
preventive procedures. Validity and reliability are not tested, which would lead to
acceptance of this evaluative approach and help in building consensus.
Additional studies are needed to assess the proposed outbreak severity index.

KEYWORDS: (Outbreak, severity index, global outbreak, SARS, MERS,
Ebola, healthcare system, assessment tool, WHO, advocacy, global health,
international cooperation)
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Background:
Global disease outbreaks are not uncommon devastating events. Some of
these outbreaks have been severe enough to destroy national civilizations [1].
The known history of outbreaks goes back 25 centuries to ancient Greece with
the devastating outbreak of the Plague of Athens [2]. Other more recent
examples include the black death in Europe that started in the 14th century and
lasted for several centuries in an on and off manner, which lead to a high
mortality rate of 20% or more in some episodes [3]. The 1918-1919 flu pandemic
was the most devastating disease outbreak in the modern era with more than 50
millions death around the world [4]. The list of global outbreaks is long and the
outbreaks vary in severity and in their social and economic consequences.
The 21st century is no exception to history. Many global outbreaks have
occurred over the last two decades such as SSRS, Mumps, the 2009 flu
pandemic, MERS, Ebola, and others. The contemporary global situation provides
ease of transportation, free markets policies, wide developmental gaps between
regions and nation states, terrorism and potential international conflicts,
availability of technologies for legal and illegal use, and other factors that make
outbreak control more challenging.
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Strategies for fighting outbreaks are vary widely between different national
healthcare systems according to wealth, sovereignty, and scientific capabilities.
However, a failure of a local healthcare system is threatening not only to the local
population but also to neighbors or the entire world population. Such a potential
threat requires the international community to cooperate in the outbreak
controlling process. International cooperation is not straightforward intervention.
Reasons that making international intervention difficult include:
1. Local systems may not able to accommodate international aid
due to absence of basic infrastructure.
2. Political sensitivity to allowing foreign intervention with
possible unknown hidden agendas.
3. Attitude of some poor countries to shift the cost of outbreak
control to the international community.
4. Advocacy weakness in the field of outbreak control especially
when outbreaks emerge in poor countries.
5. Absence of a specific international apparatus that collects and
distributes aid. Despite the efforts of WHO and other
international agencies, this kind of emergency may need a
more robust apparatus.
6. Absence of definition and criteria for global disease outbreaks
that require international involvement.
International intervention needs to be legitimized in those countries
requesting support or in those countries refusing to cooperate. The road to
2	
  
	
  

	
  

repairing international agencies or establishing a new international agency to
serve global outbreak control starts with the definition of a global outbreak by
efficient assessment tool. It is obvious that not all outbreaks need international
involvement. However, public health globally does not have an efficient tool to
determine if a severe outbreak requires international attention.
Purpose of the capstone:
The purpose of this capstone is to develop a disease outbreak severity
index. This index will be utilized to evaluate the virulence of the outbreak agent,
transmissibility, characteristic of local population, performance of local health
system, and other factors. The outbreak severity index is a dynamic tool that
would serve in the evaluation of an outbreak early in its emergence and during
the follow-up period. The score of outbreak severity index will be used in
determination if the outbreak is severe enough to launch urgent protective
measures and to advocate for external intervention.
Current global public health practices depend on mortality rates and other
indices that are utilized by non-professional media for evaluation of disease
outbreaks. Recent history has shown that global outbreaks may be affected by
many factors that need to be taken in consideration. The goal of proposing such
a measurement tool is to reach a global consensus that makes public health
practice function at its highest capacity in order to enhance outbreak evaluation
and control. The process of assessment tool development will require more
evaluation prior to its adoption. However, this proposal aims to initiate the
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process of thinking about the importance of an outbreak assessment tool
whether this particular measurement tool is adopted or not. The outbreak severity
index will require additional development to enhance its validity and reliability
prior to its adoption.
Statement of the problem:
Outbreaks as disasters that affect much larger sections of the population
than most of common natural disasters have no unified or integrated assessment
tools to measure the outbreak’s severity and that can be utilized to initiate an
appropriate mitigation process. Global public health practices depend on different
models of the assessment process taking social and political circumstances into
consideration. Such circumstances may delay many preventive and assistance
efforts. An outbreak severity index should fill

this gap in appreciation of such

calamities.
Overview of project process:
This capstone project is a descriptive study. Some of the global outbreaks
that occurred in the last few years were selected to be reviewed; including SARS,
MERS, and Ebola. These outbreaks were selected due to their global impact and
because they occurred in different areas of the world with different healthcare
systems. The review of these outbreaks was from public health perspective. The
next step was to review the literature to identify the factors that lead to
emergence and spread of each outbreak. Identification of important factors was
followed by standardization of each factor. The last step was the development of
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a scoring system for these factors (indices) and evaluating these three outbreaks
according the new scoring system. The end result of this evaluation is a score
that is associated with each outbreak to indicate its severity in a comprehensive
and integrated manner.
Scope and importance of the study:
The outbreak severity index is theoretically applicable for any outbreak.
However, the assessment of an outbreak is a dynamic process and takes the
evaluator’s prospective into consideration. It will take the process of outbreak
evaluation to higher objective and a structural level. It is not a mathematical test,
but rather an appropriate model that will unify global public health activists in
asking for improved processes in dealing with outbreaks that threaten the lives of
an uninformed population and direct assistance to where it is mostly needed. It
would also limit the effect of political and diplomatic professionals dealing with
such disasters.
The outbreak severity index is a new approach that should be adopted by
the global public health community to gain credibility. This process will require
additional studies and efforts to build a consensus for such a measurement tool.
Testing the validity and reliability of the outbreak severity index is one of the main
challenges. Some of indices of the outbreak severity index may carry greater
importance than others to be counted as equal. However, the outbreak severity
index is an integrative approach rather than a partial evaluative approach.
Interpretation and availability of information may also be considered issues
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Description of recent global outbreaks:
1- SARS:
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) was recognized in
Guangdong Province in China in 2002 for the first time [5]. The first known case
occurred in a physician from Guangdong Province, who after visiting his family in
Hong Kong, was admitted to ICU with respiratory failure after five days of
symptoms [6]. The infection spread to 30 countries around the world
predominantly through air travel [7][8]. The World Health Organization (WHO)
issued a global health alert in March 2003. By June 2004, 8,447 cases of SARS
had been identified with 813 deaths (9.6 % mortality) [5].
Symptoms:
SARS is predominantly a respiratory disease occurring as a form of
atypical pneumonia [9]. The WHO defines suspected cases as a person with
documented fever (temperature >38o), symptoms of lower respiratory tract
infection, and contact with a SARS patient or patient with travel history to an area
of documented transmission. However, a probable case was defined as a
suspected case plus chest radiological findings of pneumonia or Acute
Respiratory Distress Syndrome (ARDS), or death from an unexplained
respiratory illness with autopsy findings suggesting ARDS [9]. Fever was the
6	
  
	
  

	
  

most common symptom at presentation, since all patients had a fever (>38o) at
the time of presentation [10][11]. The fever could reach up to 40o [11]. Myalgia
and weakness were also present in almost all patients. Dry cough and dyspnea
were evident in most of the patients [11]. Other symptoms include headache,
nausea, arthralgia, dizziness, chest pain, diarrhea, and sore throat [11]. Many
patients were suffering also from anxiety and depression [10].
Mode of transmission:
The spread of SARS was mainly person-to-person [12]. The route of
transmission is through direct contact with the body’s mucus membranes with
transmission by droplet or other fomites [13]. Transmission occurs when a
person is exposed to a very ill SARS patient such as a family member or health
care workers. Also intense exposure to a SARS patient in places such as
airplanes or work places may carry the same hazards [13]. The arousals
transmission such as the transmission of measles or influenza is another
possibility. However, the reproduction number (R0) was three, which was more
consistent with direct contact or a thick and large droplet mode of transmission
[13]. Another important factor was the aerosolizing procedures occurring at
hospitals that might increase the risk of transmission. Other modes of
transmission such as the fecal-to-oral route were suspected since significant
number of SARS patients had diarrhea. However, the possibility of environmental
contamination as a transmission route was another challenging and interesting
factor. A study in Hong Kong had used the spatial distribution of outbreak cases
and modeling of airflow dynamics to investigate the possibility of airborne
7	
  
	
  

	
  

transmission of SARS [14]. The study concluded that exposure to a common
source is another possibility for transmission rather than person-to-person
contact; the sewage system could be the common source. The study noted that
security and shopping mall workers did not register a single infection. However,
many residents in other units and buildings were infected early in the peak of the
outbreak.
An animal reservoir was an important issue not only to determine the
source but also to control the outbreak. The SARS-coronavirus was thought to be
initiated from animal origin and recently crossed from these animal reservoirs to
infect humans. However, many animals including the Chinese ferret-badger,
beaver, domestic cat, hog badger, Himalayan palm civet, and raccoon dog from
the live-animal market in Shenzhen were tested [15]. The study focused on these
animals due to early reports indicating a higher incidence among restaurant
workers handling wild mammals. The study succeeded in identifying SARS- like
coronaviruses from the raccoon dog and palm civet that were genetically almost
identical. The possibility of transmission could not be excluded. The study
concluded that these animals might represent the intermediate host but not the
natural reservoir. Bats have been identified as a reservoir for many coronavirus
species [16]. However, the strain of coronavirus identified in the horseshow bat
(Rhinolophus) suggested that bats in general were a natural reservoir for the
SARS-like coronavirus despite the slight difference, which could be explained by
recombination to increase genetic diversity and fitness [16].
Diagnosis:
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The diagnosis of SARS relies primarily on clinical suspicion [17]. The
clinical features which suggesting the SARS diagnosis are numerous. However,
the context of the outbreak’s time and place plays a significant role. Following the
outbreak in Canada, a directive approached was proposed. A study of 273
laboratory-confirmed SARS patients was conducted to explore the clinical
manifestations and source of infection in Canada [17]. Exposure to ill patients in
health care facilities occurred in 80% of confirmed cases followed by 17% in the
household exposure to SARS patients. A history of travel was associated with
only 3 of those exposed. Respiratory symptoms such as a cough and dyspnea
were associated with less than 60% of confirmed cases. Pulmonary infiltrates
and blood cell count abnormalities such as lymphopenia and thrombocytopenia
at admission were associated with confirmed cases. Symptoms and signs of a
common viral upper respiratory tract infection such as rhinorrhea and a sore
throat were associated with excluded cases. The study concluded that in
absence of a fever and a significant history of exposure, SARS was unlikely.
The incubation period for SARS is a maximum of 10 days [18]. However, it
ranges from 2-10 days [19] and with a mean of 6-7 days [20]. This relatively long
incubation period mandates an efficient and rapid means for early detection and
diagnosis. Reverse Transcription- Polymerase Chain Reaction (RT-PCR) is a
mainstay diagnostic tool during the illness [20]. However, it is affected by the type
of sample (plasma, nasogastric aspiration, stool, or other) and also by the viral
load. The viral load is influenced by the replication activity of the virus in the
affected tissue and tends to be more evident in the second week of illness,
9	
  
	
  

	
  

making a false negative result significant concern. Testing SARS antibodies in a
clinical sample could be used as a screening method especially after it was made
available by the WHO. Enzyme Linked ImmunoSorbant Assay (ELISA) and
Immunofluorescence Assay (IFA) are examples of the antibodies detection test.
The limitations of these tests are their low negative predictive value and the fact
that seroconversion happened late in the course of the disease [21]. Isolation of
the virus is time consuming and not widely available.
Treatment:
The treatment strategy could be divided into drugs targeting the
coronavirus itself through eradication or reducing its activity, reduction of the
inflammatory response by the body, and/or by general supportive measures.
Antiviral drugs were utilized to deactivate the coronavirus. The usage of antiviral
drugs may be more effective if it is utilized in the replicative phase before the
damage occurred [22]. Ribavirin was chosen as the drug of choice due to its
broad-spectrum activity against coronaviruses in general [23]. However, ribavirin
did not show viral growth inhibition in laboratory tests with the dose commonly
utilized [24]. Anemia and cardiac and liver toxicity were the major adverse side
effects [25]. Protease inhibitors, another group of antiviral drugs, were tried. The
combination of Lopinavir, and ritonavir were used, since they had shown efficacy
against HIV due to synergistic characteristics [23]. This combination had better
survival outcomes and lower side effects [26]. Reduction in the immunological
response

by

corticosteroid

was

the

second

strategy

during

the

immunopathological phase. SARS had shown a massive immunological
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response that led to massive tissue damage [27]. Also, CT scan of SARS
patients commonly demonstrated a Bronchiolitis obliterans organizing pneumonia
(BOOP) [28], a condition that is characterized by bronchiolitis obstruction due to
inflammation, which is responsive to corticosteroids. However, use of
corticosteroids is almost always a controversial clinical issue. On the one hand,
the use of corticosteroid would reduce the destructive immunological response,
and on the other side reduce the body’s resistance to the invasive microbe and
thus increase its activity and replication. Many corticosteroid regimens with high
and low potent steroid were tried, but it seems that the use of corticosteroids
would be dictated by the individual patient’s situation specially those approaching
respiratory failure [23]. Convalescent plasma was also used with corticosteroids
in many patients. The convalescent plasma is plasma that has been taken from
recovered patients and then injected into sick patients to obtain the advantage
from the antibodies that have been formed during the sickness of the donators. A
retrospective study with a small group of patients produced a better outcome
[29]. Intravenous immunoglobulin also has been utilized for very sick patients
[30]. Supportive measures are those interventions that improve the general
condition of the patient such as feeding, breathing, and circulation. SARS is
mainly a respiratory disease and lung failure is the worse consequence that may
lead to death. Securing efficient ventilation is crucial intervention used to prevent
patient deterioration. Noninvasive positive pressure ventilation (no intubation)
was shown to be effective in treating patients with acute respiratory failure and it
was used particularly for health care workers [31]. However, due to fears of
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spreading the infection by this aerosol procedure, it has been banned in some
countries [23].

Invasive mechanical ventilation is the only choice when the

patient has deteriorated and respiratory failure is evident. Other new treatment
modalities such as interferon had been tried and shown some efficacy [32].
Fatality:
Six months after the emergence of this novel disease, the WHO updated
the fatality rate of SARS [18]. The overall fatality rate was estimated to be from
14 to 15 %. However, this rate has a wide range from 0 to 50%. Age was the
main factor affecting the fatality rate. In 24 year old or younger patients, the
fatality was less than 1%, while in patients older than 64 years; the fatality rate
was 50%. The presence of another disease was another determent factor.
Differences occurred between health systems around the world. The Australian
and American fatality rate was 0%. However, in Canada, China, and Hong Kong,
fatality rates were around 15% [8].
Prevention:
The transmissibility of SARS is much less than other viral diseases with
respiratory transmission such as influenza. The reproductive number of single
SARS case was estimated to be around 3 cases in the presence of control efforts
[33]. However, in the absence of specific control methods, SARS can spread
much more widely. Early identification of cases, tracing of contacts, isolation, and
quarantine are the crucial control strategies. The ideal control method would be
the development of an effective vaccine, which has not been achieved [34].
12	
  
	
  

	
  

In March 2003, WHO issued an emergency travel advisory [35], composed
of general instructions about direct contact with SARS patients. In April 2003,
WHO issued another advisory, advising postponement of travel to Hong Kong,
Beijing and Shanxi Province in China and to Toronto, Canada [36]. In July 2003,
WHO lifted this restrictive advisory [37].
Legislative effort was used in some countries to enforce the commitment
to the quarantine individuals at home. Singapore issued the Infectious Disease
Act, which prohibited breaking home quarantine [38]. Schools were also closed
and all other public gatherings were postponed. Home quarantine was strict and
was under continuous surveillance by cameras installed in homes. Passengers
were screened at airports. Taiwan established a number of military facilities to
serve as locations for isolation [38]. The definition of a SARS case was expanded
early in the outbreak due to uncertainty concerning SARS. This expansion of the
definition led to unnecessarily isolation [39]. In addition, restriction on personal
movement and traveling between different districts was utilized as a potential
way to reduce the spread of the outbreak [33].
Healthcare workers were the group most affected by the SARS outbreak
and protection of this group was vital not only for it, but also for the community
being served. N95-mask wearing, gloves and gowns, and hand washing were the
main precautionary measures used by healthcare workers, which demonstrated
their protective advantages [40]. Other strict surveillance approaches for
healthcare workers were implemented. Streamlined workflow at hospitals and
fever screening twice a day were examples for these measures [41]. Extra
13	
  
	
  

	
  

precautions

were

applied

for

some

healthcare

workers,

such

as

anesthesiologists, who were involved in invasive procedure [42].
2- MERS:
Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS CoV) was diagnosed first in
the United Kingdom in September 2012 for a Qatari patient transferred by air
ambulance from an ICU in a Qatari hospital. The virus was given the name of
Novel Coronavirus (nCoV). It was compared with another coronavirus that was
almost identical isolated from the lungs of Saudi patient who died in the
Netherlands [43]. The WHO thought that this novel virus was different from
SARS and was concerned about the coming season of pilgrimage (Hajj) as a
serious opportunity for the virus to spread [44]. Two weeks after the first case
was identified, WHO failed to find any evidence of human-to-human transmission
[45]. Six weeks later in November 2012, four cases were reported from Saudi
Arabia and Qatar in which two were family members [46]. In May 2013, the name
of disease was changed to MERS-CoV, with a total of 44 patients mainly in Saudi
Arabia being identified [46].
Symptoms:
MERS-CoV is mainly a respiratory disease. Despite the severity of this
disease, it has been thought that it is a part of wide spectrum of symptomatology
including a much milder form. Some patients did not require admission and some
did not have respiratory symptoms initially [47]. In a study of 47 patients in Saudi
Arabia, 98% had fever and fever was the most prominent feature [47]. However,
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in other studies including 70 patients in Saudi Arabia, fever occurred in only 61%
[48]. Cough, shortness of breath, and chest pain were present in the majority of
patients [47]. Other symptom such as hemoptysis, headache, and myalgia were
present in some patients. Gastrointestinal symptoms such as diarrhea, nausea,
and vomiting were also evident in some patients and were the initial symptoms in
the case that occurred in France [47].
The majority (89%) of patients required mechanical ventilation. Also, the
majority (96%) of patients had comorbid diseases [47]. In the first cluster
outbreak in Al-Hasa, Saudi Arabia, the median incubation period was 5.2 days
and majority of patients had an incubation period of 12.4 days [47].
Thrombocytopenia

and

lymphopenia,

hematological

abnormalities,

were

identified in almost one third of the patients. Also, Liver enzyme abnormalities
were identified in less than half of the patients. Almost all patients had abnormal
chest radiographic studies [43].
Mode of transmission:
MERS-CoV has been isolated from camels in many Middle Eastern
countries including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt, and Oman. The close relationship
between the geographical area of these animals and rate of disease occurrence
was linked. It had been shown that people working in close contact with camels
are at higher risk of infection with this novel virus [49]. Other animals such as
goats, cows, sheep, water buffalo, swine and wild birds were tested for this virus
with negative results [45]. However, a close strain of MERS beta-coronavirus
was isolated from bats in South Africa [50]. It is interesting that less than 40% of
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MERS patients reported contact with camels [51]. Also, most of infections among
camels are asymptomatic or occur with mild respiratory symptoms. These facts
make speculation of widespread infection among camels not only in the Arabian
peninsula but even to Africa a significant concern [51]. Human-to-human
transmission was limited to family members and healthcare workers, which made
the assumed transmission route to be difficult between humans [52]. The role of
secondary transmission in household with MERS was very limited, and estimated
to be approximately 5% [53].
Diagnosis:
The WHO recommends collection of specimens from the upper and lower
respiratory tracts. However, collection of sera should be performed in the first 14
days after disease onset [54]. Real Time-Reverse Transcription Polymerase
Chain Reaction (qRT-PCR) is the main method to diagnose the disease among
patients [50]. qRT-PCR has to be detected in at least two specific targeted
genomes to be considered positive. However, serological tests are available that
are

mainly

used

for

screening

purposes.

ELISA,

or

enzyme-linked

ImmunoSorbant assay is the first test in the series of serological tests utilized.
Positive ELISA should be confirmed by immunofluorescence assay (IFA), or by
microneutralization assay [55].
The clinical picture and contact history should determine the need for
screening. However, WHO defines a confirmed case as a patient with
confirmatory laboratory test regardless of the clinical picture [56]. A probable
case is one with suggestive for pneumonia or acute respiratory distress, and a
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history of travel to the Middle East or a history of contact with a confirmed case of
MERS [56]. However, other studies suggested that the onset of the disease
would occur after two days of arrival from the Middle East unless a strong history
of contact to MERS patient had occurred [57].
Treatment:
The treatment of MERS should begin early when suspicion of MERS is in
the list differential diagnosis. The clinical features that suggest severe pneumonia
or acute respiratory distress syndrome with no other explanation should be
treated seriously as MERS. The first measure is the isolation of the patient with
droplet precautions. Supportive measures such as oxygen and fluid therapy are
the mainstay of treatment. WHO recommends prompt oxygen therapy that can
be administered through invasive or noninvasive procedures. Clinicians should
not hesitate to start mechanical ventilation to insure a good blood oxygen level
[58]. Also, antibiotics are recommended until the diagnosis of MERS is confirmed
[58]. Antiviral therapy, such as ribavirin and oseltamivir is not beneficial [58].
However, a combination of interferon and ribavirin was thought to have
therapeutic and prophylactic effects [59][60]. Although ribavirin may produce the
best outcome, the high prevalence of toxicity such hemolysis limits its use [61].
Fatality:
In January 5, 2015, the total incidence of MERS cases was 828 cases
[62]. The total number of deaths was 357, representing a 43% mortality rate. The
mortality rate was 21% in United Arab Emirates [63]. Despite the increase in the
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incidence of MERS in 2014, the mortality rate decreased from 60%, a rate
reported by WHO in mid 2013 [64].
Prevention:
The MERS outbreak has been dealt with mainly by containment, since
there is neither an effective vaccination nor a specific treatment. Containment is
centered on isolating infected patients in order to break the transmission cycle,
which involves no other mode of transmission such as zoonotic transmission.
CDC recommends the use of an airborne infection control room as the gold
standard for treatment; otherwise, the patient should wear a facemask.
Adherence to Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) should be strictly required
especially during aerosol procedures such as intubation or tracheal lavage
specimen collection [65]. A containment strategy among contacts is another
important factor to limit the spread of this outbreak. Strict recommendations were
proposed for health workers who were exposed to MERS patients especially
those who did not wear PPE. Medical evaluation, and immediately stopping work
are part of these recommendations. Also, screening and education of visitors
were recommended [65].
3-Ebola:
Ebola is one of the viral hemorrhagic fever diseases. The present
outbreak in West Africa is not the first Ebola outbreak, which has been preceded
by several others; the first known outbreak was in 1976 in Sudan and Zaire.
However, other less significant outbreaks occurred in the late seventies of the
last century in Sudan, and Zaire. In 1990, the few asymptomatic cases identified
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in the United States, were attributed to monkeys imported from Philippines. In
1994, Gabon was stricken by an Ebola outbreak, and outbreaks were discovered
between 1995-1996 in Gabon, Congo, and the Ivory Coast. Also, many
laboratory incidents occurred in England, Italy, and Russia during the same
period. Ebola was undetected until another series of significant outbreaks was
identified in Uganda, Republic of Congo, and South of Sudan between 2000 and
2004. Another wave of outbreaks occurred between 2007 and 2009 in the same
West African countries. Succeeding outbreaks were limited and controlled in
these countries until the disastrous outbreak of March 2014 in Guinea, Liberia,
and Sierra Leone. This outbreak was accompanied by a relatively limited
outbreak in Central Africa in the Democratic Republic Of Congo [66]. To date, the
2014 outbreak in West Africa is the most severe and long-lasting Ebola outbreak
[67].
The Ebola virus is a single-strand RNA virus belonging to Filoviridae
family, which contains Ebolavirus, Lloviu virus, and Marburgvirus. The Ebola
virus has been divided into five strains according to genetic and antigenic
properties: Sudan (EBOV-S), Zaire (EBOV-Z), Tai Forest (EBOV-TF), Reston
(EBOV-R) and Bundibugyo (EBOV-B) [67].
Symptoms:
The clinical manifestations are similar to those of viral hemorrhagic fever.
Generalized weakness was the most prominent clinical feature, occurring in 80%
of the patients followed by fever in 78% of patients [68]. The clinical features may
vary depending on the strain of the Ebola virus causative the infection [67]. Also,
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the clinical features and outcomes differ according to the level of viremia. The
non-survivor tend to have 100-1000 folds of viremia when compared to the
survivors [69]. The clinical manifestations were divided into three phases: (1)
Early onset, which presents similarly to influenza. (2) Involvement of the
gastrointestinal tract. (3) The late stage is characterized by hemorrhage, multiple
organ failure, and rapid clinical decline [70]. In the early stage fever, chills, and
myalgia are the main symptoms. Lethargy, cough, headache, anorexia, diarrhea,
abdominal pain, vomiting, and hypotension follow these symptoms [69]. .
Hemorrhagic symptoms do not always occur and it was observed in only 26% of
patients in an Ebola treatment center in Conakry [68]. Hemorrhagic
manifestations include bruising, epistaxis, bleeding from venipuncture sites, and
bleeding from the gastrointestinal and urinary tracts [69]. Tachypnea, shock, and
coma are the hallmarks of the late stage along with imminent death and massive
necrosis in many organs such as the liver, spleen, and kidneys [69].
Mode of transmission:
The early Ebola outbreak was thought to be transmitted by unsafe
injections in Zaire in 1976 [71]. However, the major route is the exposure to the
Ebola virus through mucosal surfaces, abrasions or injuries to the skin, or
parental transmission [72]. The transmission of Ebola tends to occur more often
in the late stage of the disease than during the incubation period and
asymptomatic patients pose little threat of transmission [73]. During the outbreak
in Uganda in 2000-2001, contact with patient’s fluids had the strongest
association with development of the disease. However, physical contact with
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patients was associated with transmission of the disease more often than
touching deceased patients. Also, sleeping on the same mat and participating in
hand washing during funeral ceremonies were associated with transmission of
the disease [74]. Another study carried out in the Democratic Republic of Congo
during the 1995 outbreak demonstrated almost the same pattern of transmission.
An increment of risk ratio was observed for those exposed to infected patients
during the late stage of the disease. The greatest contact risk occurred by
touching patients [75]. The aerosol pathway is another potential route of
transmission, which was documented in an animal experimental model [76].
Tracing of transmission routes is complicated by the fact that
asymptomatic individuals are present. Individuals who were exposed to an ill
patient and did not develop symptoms were identified in Gabon in 1996. A study
of 24 individuals with close patient contact found that 11 had a positive
immunological test for Ebola [77]. Also, Ebola virus antibodies were found in
asymptomatic individuals inhabiting the tropical forests of the Central African
Republic. The prevalence of positive antibodies was more evident in huntergathers than in farmers [78].
The reproductive number (R0) is the “average of number of successful
offspring that the organism is capable of producing, in the absence of crowding
and other density-dependent effects” [79]. It takes in consideration that everyone
is susceptible regardless of other factors. The R0 was estimated to be 2.7 from
the two outbreaks in Africa in 1995 and 2000 [73]. The disease reservoir raises
an interesting question despite knowing that the reservoir is less important than
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understanding the dynamic of transmission [79]. The examination of carcasses of
wild animals, which was performed between 2001 and 2003 in Gabon and
Republic of Congo, found positive serological evidences that gorillas,
chimpanzees, and duikers had been infected by the Ebola virus [80]. Another
survey of the Ebola virus, which was performed in Cameron, Gabon, and
Republic of Congo, estimated the seroprevalence rate among wild chimpanzees
to be 12.9% [81]. The presence of this rate among wild animals suggests a form
of non-lethal disease. However, deaths among certain species such as gorillas
and chimpanzees were attributed to infection with Ebola, which was considered
as the source of outbreaks in Central Africa [82]. These deaths resulted in an
effort to find the real reservoir in wild species. Following the outbreak in
Democratic Republic of Congo in 1995, 3066 vertebrates were tested for the
Ebola virus (Zaire subtype). The selection of these animals was based on
exposure history and the presence of animals in a specific habitat. The result
was negative [83]. More than 400 bats among other animals were tested in
Democratic Republic of Congo at the site of 1976 outbreak, and it failed to
demonstrate any evidence of Ebola antibodies [84]. However, in an incremental
inoculation of Ebola virus a variety of species including fruit and insectivorous
bats, bats supported the replication and circulation of a high titer of the virus [85].
1390 bats from different species were collected between 2003 and 2006 from
endemic and non-endemic areas in Gabon and Democratic Republic of Congo,
demonstrating that 5% of these bats were infected. That rate declined to 1%
following the outbreak, indicating a role of bats in transmission of the virus [86].
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Fruit bats were tested in West Africa and followed by fitting with a radio
transmitter. After 13 months, the infected bats demonstrated long-term survival
[87].
Diagnosis:
Ebola is a disease that shares many clinical symptoms with other
diseases such as typhoid fever and malaria especially in the endemic area.
Clinical suspicion of suggestive symptoms and travel history is crucial in the
diagnostic process. The main limitation of many specific diagnostic tools is that
they are unable to detect the virus before the onset of symptoms, which makes
them useless as screening tools [88]. There are many specific diagnostic tools
for Ebola hemorrhagic fever. Antigen-capture enzyme-linked immunosorbent
assay (ELISA) testing, IgM ELISA, Reverse Transcription-Polymerase Chain
Reaction

(RT-PCR),

Virus

isolation,

IgM

and

IgG

antibodies,

and

immunohistochemistry testing are examples of these specific tools [89]. Viral
isolation is the gold standard diagnostic tool. However, this procedure poses a
very high level of hazard. It is also very difficult and needs a high level of
expertise and technology. The shipment of infected specimens from endemic
areas to well-developed laboratories demands safety procedures and certain
important requirements such as cool chain. Electron microscopy is fast and
sensitive especially when aggregated with immunological antigen. It can examine
many types of specimen such as serum, a thin section of the infected material,
and cultural fluid. The main limitation is the cost and level of expertise required. A
minimum number of viruses to be visualized is also a limitation. Antigen-capture
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ELISA is specific diagnostic tool. Animal antibodies, which can be used for
antigenic capture, have been developed for many Ebola virus strains. ELISA is
under development and appears to be a very promising diagnostic tool. Currently
the most widely used diagnostic tool is the real-time RT-PCR due to its simplicity
and sensitivity. It is more specific than ELISA especially when specific dye is
used. Obtaining the results of the RT-PCR test takes about 2-3 hours. With the
development of specific premiers and props, RT-PCR is the test of choice to
confirm the diagnosis. Continuous mutation and emergence of a new viral strain
may be a source of concern regarding the diagnostic use of RT-PCR [90].
Treatment:
Currently, there is no standard of treatment and the treatment occurs
mainly through the use of supportive measures [91]. CDC recommends fluid and
electrolyte replacement, maintenance of blood pressure and oxygen status, and
treatment of secondary infections as supportive measures [92].
Antibody therapy was tried in 1995 during the outbreak in the Democratic
Republic of Congo. Plasma from Ebola survivors were transfused to eight
infected patients, half of them complaining of hemorrhagic manifestations. Only
one of these eight patients died, a death rate much lower than that seen in
previous outbreaks, which was 80% [93]. This plasma transfusion procedure
contains clotting factors beside the antibodies, which could reduce the severity of
hemorrhage [94]. However, the sample size was very small. Plasma transfusion
carries the hazards of transfusion reaction and transmission of other pathogens.
Monoclonal immunoglobulin G (IgG) was tried in animals. Six monkeys were
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treated with equine IgG and showed a limited beneficial effect in viral load and
delay of death [95]. Other trials of single monoclonal antibodies were
unsuccessful; however, they lead to the concept of a cocktail of multiple
monoclonal antibodies therapy [94]. Two IgG were administered in monkeys
before and after inoculation of Ebola virus, showing protective benefits before the
decline of circulating IgG [96]. This procedure indicated the need to prolong the
half-life of antibodies. Unlike in the case for Ebola patients, it was administered
before the infection. New generations of cocktail antibody therapy such as ZMAb
and MB-003 were introduced in animal models. MB-003 had shown a protective
effect approaching 70% when injected on the first day after inoculation [97].
However, ZMAb showed 100% protection when administered 24 hours after
inoculation and 50% when administered 48 hours after inoculation [98]. ZMaap is
a promising treatment for infected animals with a specific combination of IgG
from ZMAb and MB-003, demonstrating 100% protection. The promising factor is
that ZMaap was administered in animals after the appearance of symptoms such
as fever, abnormal blood counts, and hemorrhage [99]. These animal trials
occurred with small sample sizes and no randomized controlled clinical trials
have been conducted.
Antiviral drugs are another treatment strategy. In addition to its side
effects profile, ribavirin did not show activity against the Ebola virus [100], and
Lamivudine did not show a decrease in mortality in Ebola patients [91].
Favipiravir, a new and promising drug, is a broad-spectrum antiviral drug,
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developed in Japan for influenza. It has demonstrated100% protection against
aerosol Ebola in an animal model [101].
Fatality:
By January 23, 2015, the total number of confirmed cases of Ebola was
13,602 with a total of 21,797 cases including non-confirmed cases in Guinea,
Liberia, and Sierra Leone. The total number of deaths was 8,675 (64%) [102].
The outbreak in Central Africa was limited and is considered to be over. The
mortality rate differs among these countries with a rate of 40% in Sierra Leone,
60% in Guinea, and 70% in Liberia [103]. Over time the fatality rate changed
from a fatality rate of 47.7% to one of 31.5% [104]. The total number of cases
was less than 2000 in any of the three countries in West Africa in October 2014.
However, by end of January 2015, the total number of confirmed cases
increased to approximately 11,000 in Sierra Leone, approximately 9,000 in
Liberia, and 3000 in Guinea. The fatality rate in the previous outbreaks starting in
1976, with the exclusion of outbreaks that had single patient, had a wide range
from 15% to 88% [66].
Prevention:
According to WHO, the incubation period is estimated to be between 2
and 21 days [105]. However, the incubation period appears to have shorter
range. In a study in Sierra Leone, the estimated incubation period was 6 to 12
days [106]. Another larger study conducted in Guinea estimated the average
incubation period to be 11.4 days [107].
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Vaccination against Ebola could be a significant step in the containment
strategy. However, there is no approved vaccine available. There are two
candidate vaccines, cAD3 and rVSV [108]; cAD3 vaccine is in phase 1 trials and
rVSV has shown protection against lethal infection of the virus in non-human
primates [91]. In the absence of an effective vaccine, CDC recommends the
following:
§

Avoidance of contact with blood and body fluids.

§

Avoidance handling items that may have come in contact with
an infected person’s blood or body fluids.

§

Avoidance of contact with bats and nonhuman primates or
blood, fluids, and raw meat prepared from these animals.

§

After you return, monitor your health for 21 days and seek
medical care immediately in case of Ebola symptoms have
developed [109].

Common Criteria of Outbreaks:
The last decade raised the challenge of the new outbreaks that were
difficult to treat and to contain. WHO defines outbreak as an “occurrence of
cases of disease in excess of what would normally be expected in a defined
community, geographical area or season” [110]. An outbreak is not defined by a
specific number of cases; rather by the presence of an increased number of
cases in a specific time and place.
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Outbreaks have many factors that lead to their emergence. The Institute
of Medicine Committee on Emerging Microbial Threats to Health in the 21st
Century explored some of these factors [111]. The committee proposed a model
of four factors interacting to produce an outbreak, including:
1. Genetic and biological factors.
2. Physical environmental factors.
3. Ecological factors.
4. Social, political, and economic factors.
These factors serve as fundamental factors that interact together in
different intensities and directions. However, based on this model, the report
proposed the following factors that are associated with one or more of these
fundamental factors:
•

Microbial adaptation and change:
Microbes are widely present in the ecosystem. The relationship
between humans and microbes are not always a threat, but in many
instances beneficial to both parties [112]. Adaptation and change is a
continuous process that assists in the survival of microbes according to
the environment in which they live. One of the important examples is the
influenza virus, which changes in each cycle of emergence. Such a
change mandates a change in vaccine every year. The adaptation could
be a result of genetic mutation or inclusion of new segments of DNA or
RNA. Despite the limited size of the viral genome, the plasticity of this
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genome to accommodate new segments and expand or shrink is evident
in the RNA virus [113]. This accommodation could result in new genera
with different characteristics. On the other hand, bacteria have many
known

ways

of

acquisition

of

new

genetic

material,

including

transformation, transduction, and conjugation [114]. Adaptation and
change are vital methods for prokaryotic cells to survive. However, the
changes accompanied by acquisition of new genetic material could be
devastating to the host.
Coronavirus in general has undergone a similar genetic adaptation
making them pathological to humans. No new major changes in the
indigenous population in the consumption of or contact with the
suspected animals were observed or reported before the emergence of
SARS or MERS in East Asia or the Arabian Peninsula respectively.
Ebola on other hand has a more interesting history. More than ten major
outbreaks have occurred in Africa with different fatality rates and different
viral strains. The adaptation process should not be ignored when trying
to understand the variability in each outbreak.
•

Human susceptibility to infection:
According to the IOM report, many factors such as impaired host
immunity, genetic polymorphism, aging, and malnourishment contribute to
human susceptibility to infection. Human immunity is a very complex
process and it is composed of physical and chemical barriers. The
immune response after passing these physical and chemical barriers is
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composed of cell-mediated and humoral-mediated responses, both of
which are subject to regulation that is affected by previous exposure to
any specific microbes. Genetic polymorphism such as that in sickle cell
anemia or thalassemia is believed to be a protective adaptation to specific
exposure to malaria. The genetic adaptation makes specific populations
less susceptible to certain infections. Malnutrition is associated with a
higher susceptibility to infection. The reverse relationship may also be true
in which an infection that causes diarrhea as an example may lead to
malnutrition.
•

Climate and weather:
The weather plays an important role in the transmission process that
involves vectors, animal reservoirs, microbes, and humans. There are
many physical elements included in changes of the weather such as
drought, rainfall, temperature, flood, wildfire, earthquakes, and others. The
interaction of these elements at each level of the transmission cycle is
different, and may lead to different outcomes. It has been predicted that
influenza cases, as an example would be more prevalent in specific
seasons than in others due to weather changes.

•

Change in ecosystem:
Environmental changes generally affect the pathogen and the host.
Currently, ecology is changing at a rapid pace due to many factors such
as global warming, forest loss, and other factors. These ecological
changes will promote change in the population characteristics of the
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pathogens and human exposure to them. Also, ecological change in the
form of weather changes such as drought and increased rainfall would
affect the abundance of vectors that transmit diseases and would lead to a
different intensity of exposure. Although the ecological changes would
affect a limited area; the effect of that change would have a widespread
global effect. Aedes aegypti mosquito, which causes yellow fever and
dengue fever, is an example of the change introduced to the New World
through slave ships.
•

Economic development and land use:
Consumption of natural resources, deforestation, dam building, and
other expansion projects in nature have led to increased contact between
human and animal reservoirs. This change in land use by humans has
resulted in the emergence of new outbreaks. Lyme disease in North
America has been linked to reforestation in Northeastern and Midwestern
USA, leading to an increase in the population of white-tailed dear, the
definitive host of vector ticks. Another example is Schistosomiasis
occurring after building dams in Senegal and Egypt for agricultural and
industrial purposes.

•

Human demographics and behavior:
The demography of any given population plays a crucial role in the rate
and susceptibility of infection. The IOM report includes four main factors
that led to this increase in susceptibility due to demographic factors. Aging
is one such factor. The world population is growing older due to success in
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controlling many acute and chronic diseases and applying safety
measures in many aspects of life. The physiological changes that
accompany aging such as decreased capability of the immune system and
reduction of gastric secretion makes aging people more prone to infection.
The aging phenomenon is worldwide, but the developed countries
represent 77% of the gain in the elderly population. Urbanization is
another important demographic factor. There is a trend toward

rural

migration to cities in this century. 40 % the growth in the world’s cities is
due to migration from rural areas. Urbanization is more evident in the
developed countries where 75% of the population lives in the cities. The
influx of people into cities was poorly accommodated due to poor
infrastructure and living arrangements. Overcrowded houses and living in
a less developed part of the cities might be the only choice for the new
migrants due to the cost of living. Living in such circumstances in addition
to lower economic security may drive the new migrants to be exposed to
higher risk behaviors such as commercial sex. Also, lower accessibility to
clean water and sanitation may aggravate their living situation. Ease of
transportation between rural and urban centers has been correlated with
the ease of transmitting infections. An increase in the number of immunecompromised individuals is another demographic risk factor. Medical
advances in treating patients with illnesses such as cancer or HIV has
contributed to this increase. Also, using drugs that reduce immunity, as a
treatment modality for some diseases is another way to produce an

32	
  
	
  

	
  

immune-compromised population. The problem of having a significant
immune-compromised

population

occurs

not

only

due

to

their

susceptibility to infection, but also due to the emergence of opportunistic
infections and drug-resistant organisms. The fourth demographic factor is
health behavior, which is affected by many factors including the social
norm, education, economic status, age, and others. Sex behavior and illicit
drug use are the main risk behaviors, which correlate with the
community’s demography.
•

Technology and industry:
Technological advancement in the medical, food safety, sanitation, and
other arenas has led to eradication or reduction in the rate of many
diseases. On other hand, the same technological advancement has also
led to emergence of other diseases. Legionella in air-conditioning
systems, E. Coli in animal husbandry practices, and toxic shock syndrome
with tampons are examples of diseases that emerged with technological
advancement. The wide use of antibiotics in animal husbandry and
aquaculture to enhance production is correlated to the development of
drug resistant bacteria. Many tools that have been developed due to the
advancement of healthcare; such as endotracheal tubes, catheters,
prosthetic heart valves, and hemodialysis machines, were considered to
be vehicles for the transmission of many diseases. This problem of
transmission of diseases was also increased by other advancements in
medical procedures such as blood transfusion and organ transplant.
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•

International travel and commerce:
Contemporary modalities of transportation have increased the average
spatial mobility of humans. The ease of mobility exposes people to each
other more often than previously. This exposure theoretically enhances
the transmission of a disease outbreak. Modern air travel has increased
the rate and speed of travel by individuals. Airplanes, ships, and trains are
closed areas that contribute to the transmission process. Influenza,
tuberculosis, measles, and many other infectious diseases have been
linked to air travel. The increase in international commerce has resulted in
70% of the fruits and vegetables that are consumed in the United State
coming from developing countries. Poultry, fish, and livestock are imported
at different rates. The introduction of food from outside a country’s borders
introduces a significant amount of parasites, microbes, snails, and other
transmission vectors. Not only living organisms, but also pathological
substances such prions in the case of cow-madness disease.

•

The breakdown of public health measures:
Adequate sanitation and hygiene, Immunization programs, control of
vector-born and zoonotic diseases, and public health legislation and
enforcement were the main indicators of a quality public health system
according to The IOM report. Adequate sanitation and clean drinking
water were the main methods to control such diseases as cholera.
Underdeveloped public health measures are not specific to developing
countries. The advancement in medical technology and the survival of a
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more elderly population and immune-compromised patients were not
accompanied by robust public measures that would control nosocomial
infections. Nosocomial infection is a leading cause of death in the USA.
Immunization has proven its efficacy and has been considered one of the
major public health achievements. However, due to a number reasons;
such as, the cost or the perception of safety of a vaccine, vaccination for a
variety of disease is in difficult. These difficulties are significant in the case
of wars or famines. The application of public health practices to some
programs in order to control diseases, as the use of Directly Observed
Therapy (DOT) to control TB, have shown efficacy. Also public health
interventions in the control of vector-born and zoonotic disease such as
the use of pesticides are important programs of the public health system.
Shortfalls in these interventions have been correlated to the increase in
vector-borne diseases. Public health police powers such as quarantine
and isolation are an important intervention in many disease outbreaks.
Failure of the public health system is devastating and can contribute in the
spread of outbreaks.
•

Poverty and social inequality:
Poverty affects accessibility to healthcare services. Low accessibility to
healthcare, poverty and social inequality have been linked to the
emergence to a number of infectious diseases such as TB. Education,
housing, infrastructure, and the absence of social agencies are examples
of factors that contribute in the emergence of disease outbreaks.
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Privatization of state owned services and foreign influx of capital have
contributed to financial crises in many countries. Poor countries are more
sensitive to global economic fluctuation. Globalization and privatization
have had a negative impact on the accessibility of healthcare in many
under-developed countries.
•

War and famine:
The linkage between wars and the emergence of disease outbreaks is
evident. Public health systems among other state and community-based
systems are vulnerable to failure during wars. War and famine cannot be
separated in most occasions. Battlefield casualties and the direct
destructive consequences of war are not the entire story. The
displacement of people forcing them to live in refugee camps with little or
no infrastructure, clean water, sewage systems, sufficient food, and or
healthcare creates a suitable place for outbreaks to emerge.

•

Lack of political will:
A disease outbreak is an exceptional situation that requires mobilization
of resources to contain it. Political will is pivotal for such mobilization.
Willingness means shifting available resources from other demands to the
battle against the disease outbreak. It also means cooperation with local
stakeholders such as the local population and private organizations to
achieve containment of the outbreak. Not only domestic authorities, but
also international cooperation is a key component of success. Since many
outbreaks involve more than a country or world region, sensitivity to
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international cooperation due to sovereignty or other reasons could
theoretically affect the control of outbreaks.
•

Intent to harm:
Biological weapons are serious threats. Despite the Biological Weapons
Convention (BWC), non-state producers add another difficulty in the
control of such threats. The IOM report pointed to the fact that civilian
scientists are unfamiliar with the nature of this threat. This unfamiliarity
concerning biological weapons may contribute to the lack of awareness of
their devastating effects. The introduction of microbes could occur by a
variety of means such as direct inoculation and infecting vectors or
reservoirs. Terrorism and technologic advancement make this threat a real
concern.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
In Chapter 2, the three examples of recent outbreaks require a better
definition of disease outbreaks that require an international intervention. In this
Chapter, a scoring system will be proposed, composed of ten indices and totaling
ten points. A score of 10 will be considered the most dangerous score,
mandating a prompt intervention, while 0 would not mandate any intervention by
the international community. Each index would represent one point on a 10-point
scale. The severity of each outbreak would be determined by comparing different
disease outbreaks.
Index 1: Novelty of the disease agent:
Outbreaks are caused by a wide variety of microbial agents. Virus,
bacteria, and fungi are not the only cause of disease outbreaks, but other
contagious material such as prions or unsafe exposure to chemicals or radiation
may be causes. Ambiguity and obscurity of the causative agent is a challenging
factor in the control and containment of outbreaks. When a public health system
is faced with an unknown disease with an unknown cause, it is difficult to control
that outbreak and interdict its transmission cycle. The assumption here is that
efforts would be exerted to identify the causative pathogen. The scoring system
is dynamic and can change from time to time during the outbreak. An outbreak
with an unknown etiology should become known as soon as possible. The
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purpose of the scoring system is to evaluate the outbreak at any time during the
outbreak.
With new technology such as the electronic microscope, PCR, and viral
culture, identification of the pathogen may occur within a very short period of
time. However, the identification of the pathogenic agent (microbe) is the first
step but not the last. There are other important factors that would reveal an
obscure pathogenic agent. These factors include knowledge about the reservoir,
mode of transmission, incubation period, and availability of diagnostic methods.
In this index, there are five questions/factors that determine the novelty of the
disease agent:
I.

Is the causative agent known?

II.

Is the source or the reservoir of that agent known?

III.

Is the mode of transmission known?

IV.

Is the incubation period known?

V.

Is there any known diagnostic procedure?

This index deals primarily with the knowledge of stakeholders about the
threat that they are facing. The answer of each question is YES or NO. There
may be difficulty knowing how much the stakeholders know about any one of
these questions. In case there is partial knowledge such as knowing some fact
about the mode of transmission but not the full picture, should this question be
considered yes or no based on knowing the mode of transmission? The answer
to this question should be left to the evaluating team. If the evaluating team
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determines that the picture is clear enough to be considered in the plan of
outbreak control, the answer should be yes. Otherwise, the answer is no when
the team finds insufficient information concerning the cycle of transmission and
clarity does not exist as to how to break the cycle in the effort to control the
outbreak. The same principle will be applied to the other questions.
The Index Score is calculated by assigning 0.2 for each question with a
NO answer. A total of 1 point is added to the total score when the investigators
do not know the causative agent, the source/reservoir of the causative agent, the
mode of transmission, the incubation period, and the absence/ unawareness of
diagnostic tools. Thus, the total score would be 0 when the five questions had
YES answers for each of them. This means that investigators are aware of the
causative agent, the source/reservoir of the causative agent, the mode of
transmission, the incubation period, and the presence/awareness of various
diagnostic tools.
Identification of causative agent is a crucial step that leads to
understanding the other properties of an outbreak. Sometimes the clinical
situation suggests a specific agent/microbe; i.e., salmonella food poising, Ebola,
malaria, and others. However, sometimes the causative agent may be unknown
at least in the beginning of the outbreak. SARS, and MERS are good examples
of this kind of outbreak. The evaluating team should consider both situations and
answer the first question accordingly. The scoring process is a dynamic process
and the point at which scoring occurs may change following any newly confirmed
result in the identification process.
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The identification of a reservoir or source of infection may be more difficult
than the identification of the causative agent. MERS and Ebola are good
examples. The process of reservoir/source identification is time consuming
involving humans, animals, and the environment. It also carries a level of
uncertainty to some extent. Despite the availability of many theories, the source
of MERS as an example is not fully understood. In some instances, the reservoir
may not be determined. On the other hand, some outbreaks such as HIV have
no known natural reservoir. However, HIV is transmitted solely by exposure to an
infected person’s body fluid. In this case, the reservoir is known as the infected
human being and the answer to the second question is yes. It is expected that
the reservoir/source is not known for many outbreaks at least at the beginning of
the outbreak.
The mode of transmission is an important factor due to concern about
breaking the transmission pathway. The level of knowledge that leads to
interruption of transmission should be considered as Yes to the third question.
The mode of transmission includes many questions such as the source of
infection, presence of a vector, transmission route, and other questions.
However, the level of knowledge that is considered sufficient at least theoretically
to stop or break the transmission cycle should be counted as a yes answer for
this question.
The incubation period is almost always a range of days or even months.
The time needed for an infected person to show the manifestation of the disease
is an important aspect of this Index. It is also the time required for
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isolation/quarantine that will enable investigators to determine that containment
has occurred. An awareness of the incubation period is critical for directing the
diagnostic and therapeutic effort especially after determination of the infection
source. A new outbreak of an unknown disease will have an uncertain incubation
period. However, understanding of incubation period will lead to a better
understanding of an effective strategy to contain the outbreak and at the same
time would lead to a decrease in the severity index of outbreak.
The fifth question regards the availability of diagnostic tools. There are
primarily two types of diagnostic procedures; the screening and the confirmatory.
Both are important. However, in the last few important outbreaks, the screening
test seems more important. Identification of a specific virus such as Ebola or
MERS was achieved by expensive and highly complicated methods such as
PCR and viral culture. These methods were not widely available and required
some level of expertise and were time consuming. The real need in the field was
for a reasonable screening test. Having such screening test would save time and
resources and would help in the containment of the outbreak by isolation or other
means. The strength of screening is another question that involves some
measurement such as specificity and sensitivity. There is no cut off point in the
predictive value for any screening test that will be used in this proposed severity
index. However, the answer to the fifth question is simply; is there a screening
test that in case of negative result the team is comfortable sending suspected
cases back to their community with no restriction. If the investigators have such a
screening test with the required level of negative predictive value, the fifth
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question can be answered Yes. The positive predictive value of the test is
important also, but lack of high predictive value would be addressed by other
confirmatory tests.
In this index, five questions/factors are assessed. Each factor has 0.2
point for a total index point of 1.0. It measures the awareness of public health
practitioners for the outbreak that they are fighting. These factors are
interconnected and some may have more importance than others. However,
these factors collectively draw a picture of the outbreak agent and its movement
from its source until its detection in the human body.
Index 2: Fatality rate:
The fatality rate (case-fatality ratio) may be calculated in a straightforward
manner. However, the determination of the fatality rate may be a difficult task. It
is the most important concern of the stakeholders. An outbreak with a 90%
fatality rate would receive more attention than an outbreak with a 10% fatality
rate. Including this index in the outbreak severity index is justified.
Determination of the fatality rate is an absolute number of deaths among
persons who have been diagnosed with specific disease. As it has been seen in
the outbreak of SARS and MERS, the fatality rate was different among various
health systems and dependent on the characteristics of patients. Also, the fatality
rate would be affected by the total number of diagnosed patients, which may not
include all patient as in the case of the Ebola outbreak. Since the severity index
is a dynamic index, the average fatality rate will be utilized and the score will
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change according to use of various diagnostic processes. The fatality rate would
be different among some people such immune-compromised patients, the
elderly, children, and patients with comorbidities, but the severity index assesses
the effect of the outbreak on any given population. The available data concerning
the fatality rate of an outbreak may represent the tip of iceberg due to the issue
of transparency or technical incompetence, but the severity index will include any
changes in the data once it becomes available.
This index is calculated by dividing the total fatality rate by 100, with the
score of this index as the result. As an example, the fatality rate of MERS was
60% at the point of emergence of the outbreak. The fatality rate score for MERS
at that point would be 60/100, or 0.6 of the total score of 1. The range of deadly
outbreaks that have 100% and non-fatal outbreak that have 0% fatality rates
represents only 10% in the Outbreak Severity Index. This low percentage of the
total index score may produce the concern of underestimating the fatality
characteristic of outbreaks. For two reasons this may not be of concern: (1) Most
outbreaks receiving international attention have a fairly high fatality rate; (2)
Fatality is not the only negative aspect of outbreaks. Poliomyelitis is a good
example of a disease that has severe non-fatal aspects.
Index 3: Incidence rate:
Incidence rate is an important index in the assessment of severity. The
incidence rate “measures the occurrence of disease onsets in a population per
unit of time of follow-up” [115]. The dominator represents persons who were at
risk of disease at specific time. However, the numerator represents the number
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of individuals having the disease. Both the dominator and numerator may be
difficult to calculate. Counting the total number of confirmed cases may not
represent the total incidence of the disease due to such reasons such as
unavailability of a confirmatory test, unavailability of a screening test,
unavailability of disease criteria that determines screening, unavailability of
resources to test the affected population, and other reasons. On the other hand,
determining the number of people at risk and the time to follow-up is almost
imposable in most cases of outbreaks. These difficulties require a modification in
the calculation of the incidence rate.
The aim of the Outbreak Severity Index is to have an objective tool to
assess outbreaks rather than precisely calculate the incidence rate. Since the
Outbreak Severity Index measurement would be of most value at the onset of an
emerging outbreak, evaluating an outbreak at its onset requires modification of
the incidence rate calculation. The proposed definition of incidence rate utilized in
the Outbreak Severity Index

is the total number of confirmed cases divided by

the total population of the affected geographical area at the time of evaluation.
The challenge in this definition is the determination of the representative
geographic area, which can be described as the area that has a homogenous
incidence of the disease. This approach leads to the possibility of having a
separate Outbreak Severity Index for each geographical area; such as, cities,
provinces, and countries.
As a result of the percentage of the modified incidence rate will be multiply
by 1000, resulting in the value utilized for this index. The maximum difference
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between the most affected area and the least affected area, which share the
same value for the other indices, is 1 point on the scale of 10 (the total score of
the Outbreak Severity Index).
Index 4: Ease of transmission:
The transmission property of outbreaks may be the most important index
from the perspective of the public health practitioner. However, the Outbreak
Severity Index deals with the ease of transmission as one index consisting of one
of ten points for the total score. Influenza is an easily transmittable disease, but it
does not receive the attention of the public due its fairly mild severity. Such would
not be the case with HIV, a devastating disease, which requires specific contact
methods of transmission. On other hand, most outbreaks having a reasonably
high transmission property may be expected to get the attention of the public
health system. The difference in the transmission capability of a specific disease
would compensate for a lower severity of the disease when two diseases are
compared. The more important issue is the fact that the Outbreak Severity Index
deals with the geographic location of the disease, the people at risk, and the
availability of resources.
The mode of transmission can be either contact or non-contact in nature.
Contact includes direct, indirect, and droplet transmission. Non-contact includes
airborne, vehicle, and vector-borne transmission [116]. Some modes of
transmission have a greater ability of to transmit a disease than others. However,
the ease of transmission is influenced by such factors as exposure time,
availability of vaccination, and availability of precaution tools. It is also difficult to
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evaluate ease of transmission by mode of transmission. The Outbreak Severity
Index will use the basic reproduction number (R0) as a measure of ease of
transmission. The basic reproduction number is the number of secondary cases
that are produced by one infected case in a completely susceptible population
[117]. If the R0 ranges between 0 and 10, the R0 will be divided by 10 to calculate
the score of the ease of transmission index. However, some outbreaks may have
an R0 of more than 10 such as measles [118]. Outbreaks with an R0 of more than
10 will be score at 1.0 in this index.
Index 5: Availability of treatment:
Treatment in the proposed Outbreak Severity Index assessment has a
broader meaning than usual. Treatment may equal cure in some definitions of
treatment availability; however, in this proposal the definition of availability of
treatment has been modified to serve as an accurate assessment of the
outbreak’s situation. The Outbreak Severity Index includes the following factors:
I.

Is there any known curative treatment?

II.

Is that treatment available in area of the outbreak?

III.

Is isolation effective in controlling transmission?

IV.

Is isolation available at the area of outbreak?
At the beginning of most outbreaks, broad-spectrum antibiotics and

antivirals might be the logical initial treatment. However, with advancement of
knowledge concerning the causative agent, a more precise treatment
approach will substitute for the initial approach. At this stage, judgment
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concerning the availability of treatment is used. However, on occasion the
infection is self-limiting and does not require other than appropriate
containment procedures. The first factor deals primarily with infections that
cause death or significant disability. These types of infections require
treatment to prevent devastating sequel. The answer to the first question is
Yes when a fatal disease or a disease that leads to disability has a known
treatment that prevents death or disability.
Despite the availability of a known treatment, it is important to assess
the ability of the local healthcare system to provide that treatment, which may
involve other factors such as accessibility to healthcare, willingness of people
to be treated, the proper and equal distribution of treatment, and other factors
that describe the integrity of the local public health system. Answering the
second question depends on the general ability of the local government to
provide treatment according to the judgment of the evaluating team. Other
factors such as local public health integrity will be assessed in a separate
index.
Isolation is an important factor for the control of outbreaks. Isolation
ranges from personal isolation of patients to quarantine of the affected area.
Isolation may depend on the dynamic of the disease transmission. A disease
with a short incubation period and an easy transmission route may make
isolation impractical. Answering the third question is based primarily on the
significance of isolation in the containment of the outbreak.
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The ability of local public health system to provide isolation at both the
personal and community level is an important factor, which may be affected
by many factors; such as, the incidence rate of the disease, the availability of
resources, the strength of law enforcement, the willingness of the local
authority to act, and political stability. Answering the fourth question gives a
panoramic image of the ability of the local public health system to provide
isolation to those cases requiring it.
This index has four factors that assess the availability of treatment of
infected cases regardless of whether that treatment is medication or isolation
with supportive measures. Each factor with a No answer will receive 0.25
points out of a total of 1.0 for this index.
Index 6: Geographical communication potential:
Humans’ movement between different geographical areas is the nature of
life. With the development of transportation methods over the last century,
movement is much more rapid and easier than before. The movement between
cities, countries, and continents is a daily practice of almost all human beings.
The reasons for that movement are different including trading, working,
education, tourism, as well as legal or illegal migration. From the point of view
this proposed of Outbreak Severity Index, migration and movement of people are
the same regardless of reason since the end result of that movement or
migration is exposure to disease outbreaks.
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Infected humans movement between different areas in the world is an
important issue in transmission of diseases. Areas with the migration of people in
and out results in a greater risk of the dissemination of an outbreak. However,
those areas that are relatively isolated in some way or other would be at a
relatively lower risk of outbreak dissemination. The direction of movement
weather entering or exiting a specific area is also important. From the
prospective of those residing outside the outbreak’ area, the inward movement
may be more concerning. On the other hand, the outward movement may pose a
greater threat for those residing outside the outbreak’s area. But, which one is
the most important? The answer to this question should depend on the work of
the evaluating team.
This proposal attempts to develop an objective measurement in this index.
However, there are number of obstacles to a universal measurement scale.
Obstacles include the following:
•

Determining the number of people passing any geographical boundary is
a difficult task. There is no method cut off the number of visitors or
migrants to a specific area as high risk. It may be that the SARS outbreak
in Hong Kong posed a higher risk of dissemination than Ebola in Liberia
due to the number of passengers visiting Hong Kong. However, that
distinction disappears when the comparison is between areas with
relatively similar characteristics such as comparing Dubai with Hong Kong
or comparing London with Paris. The total number of visitors are
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important, but there is no critical number that poses a greater risk than
another.
•

Type of visitor is also an important factor. Tourists and businesspersons
normally have better healthcare accessibility and better financial capability
as health determinants than illegal migrants. On other hand, many
countries perform screening procedure for legal migrants and visitors,
which do not include illegal migrants. The type of visitor or migration is a
significant factor that would not be taken in consideration if the total
number of visitors and migrants were the only factor in the judgment
concerning the risk of outbreak dissemination.

•

The relativity of risk is another important factor. Despite globalization,
some areas may pose a greater threat to their neighbors and local region
than areas farther away. As an example, an outbreak in Mexico poses a
threat to United States unlike an outbreak in West Africa. It also poses a
greater threat to southern and southwestern states than northern states.
Not only at the state level, but it also at the city level cities. San Diego may
have greater threat from an outbreak in Mexico than Sacramento.
Due to these reasons, the determination of geographical potential of

an outbreak should be assessed according the standpoint of the evaluating
team. This score of this index will be determined by the height of the risk
according to the potential of for geographical communication. A high-risk area
will be given a score of 1.0 while a low-risk area will be given 0.0 points. The
score may be different from place to place inside states/provinces, countries,
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or continents. The global assessment of an outbreak in certain countries will
be difficult. However, USA, most of Europe, China, and some places in
Middle East such as Makkah (pilgrimage) may be categorized easily as
having a high risk of dissemination. It is conceivable that most areas of the
world could be considered as high risk of dissemination. The value of this
index would become clear when the evaluating team deals with areas such
West Africa (Ebola) with a relatively lower risk of dissemination to the globe
than Hong Kong (SARS).
Index 7: Population density:
The density of population is playing a role in ease of transmission. It is not
only due to exposure of high number of people to infection, but also due the
situation of heavily populated areas. Deficiencies in clean sources of water,
efficient sanitations, and good housing circumstances are often accompanying
the residents of heavily populated areas.
The classification of population density from high to low could be achieved
by many ways. However, the outbreak severity index will follow the classification
of the United States Department of agriculture (USDA) [119] with some
modification. The USDA’s map of global population density is classifying the
population density into six categories. For simplification and due to smallness of
difference between the lowest two categories, they will be counted as one
category. The classification will be as the following:
1. 0-10 persons/ square kilometer (lowest).
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2. 11- 40 persons/ square kilometer.
3. 41- 100 persons/ square kilometer.
4. 101- 500 persons/ square kilometer.
5. > 500 persons/ square kilometer.
The width of each category is not equal. However, the purpose of this
index is including the factor population density as outbreak dissemination factor.
That purpose is clearly indicated between the two extremes of this scale. Each
category will be assigned a 0.2 point of the total index score, which is 1.0. It is a
cumulative score in which second category will be assigned with 0.4, third will be
assigned with 0.6, fourth will be assigned with 0.8, and finally fifth score will be
assigned with 1.0, the maximum score of this index.
Index 8: Political stability:
Political stability has many direct and indirect facets that affect the spread
of outbreaks in communities. Outbreaks are similar to the most of other disasters
that need efficient governmental interference. It is actually hard to imagine a
successful outbreak’s containment without governmental effort. Public health is
by its nature a governmental duty despite the importance of collaboration with
privet sector. Outbreak controlling involves many dimensions of work such as
education, treatment, and prevention. However, police power as in isolation and
quarantine is a fundamental job of public health that needs a governmental
legitimacy. That leads to the conclusion of importance of efficient governmental
in the process of outbreak control.
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The shape of governments is different around the world. Before
assessment of the efficiency of national and local government, failed states
should excluded and assignment with the maximum score of this index, which is
1.0. The definition of failed state is difficult [120] and probably influenced by
political agendas of the evaluators. However, the failed state in this proposal is
that state, which is not able to enforce laws upon infected area. This includes civil
war, insurgency, and famine. Corruption, inflation, inequality, and other similar
factors would affect the government. However, these factors would not be
included in the definition of failed state. Failed state is basically inability of
government to manage and control outbreak due to weakness of the
government.
The assessment of political stability in non-failed government would
follow the United Nations’ ten measures of promoting and consolidation of
democracy [121]. These recommendations are:
1. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
2. Freedom of association.
3. Freedom of expression and opinion.
4. Access to power and its exercise in accordance with the rule of law.
5. The holding of periodic free and fair elections by universal suffrage and by
secret ballot as the expression of the will of the people.
6. A pluralistic system of political parties and organizations.
7. The separation of powers.
8. The independence of the judiciary.
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9. Transparency and accountability in public administration.
10. Free, independent and pluralistic media.
Absence of factor of these ten factors will add 0.1 point to the outbreak
severity index. In case of absence of all of these ten factors will lead to a state
that resembling a failed state. In other word, some totalitarians countries are
equivalent to failed state. That might not be true from the political point of view.
However, the political stability index is measuring the ability of governments to
deal with outbreak. Absence of transparency, as an example, may be more
important than many other indices since it would hinder the ability of the
evaluating team to assess the situation. However, having these factors in this
systemic

way

would

provide

a

balance

appreciation

of

governmental

performance.
Index 9: Quality of local healthcare system:
The quality of local healthcare system is not a scale of general healthcare
performance. It is solely for outbreak control ability. WHO had published an index
for the world’s healthcare system [122]. However, that index includes general
assessment factors that might not represent the ability of outbreak control. On
the other side, CDC had published with collaboration with other organizations
performance standards for national, state, and local public health system based
on the ten essential public health services [123]. The limitation of this
performance standers tool is the difficulty of measurement especially for
countries that are not following the western model of healthcare. The focus of this
index requires a simple and reflective instrument tool.
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WHO is following an outbreak management system in the form of alert
and response operation [124]. The aim of that system is to manage the global
outbreaks. The outbreak severity index will adopt that system for national and
local assessment of public health ability of outbreak management. It is composed
from the following six factors:
1. Epidemic intelligence – systemic event detection.
2. Event verification.
3. Information management and dissemination.
4. Real time alert.
5. Coordinated rapid outbreak response.
6. Public health logistic.
The assessment of these six factors will depend on the informed judgment
of the evaluating team. These six factors will be turned to the following six
questions:
1. Is the local health system able to detect the infected persons efficiently?
2. Is the local health system able to verify and authenticate the
epidemiological information?
3. Is the flow of information from base to head of the outbreak team and vise
versa performed in efficient way?
4. Is the information passed in a reasonable time that makes intervention
efficient?
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5. Is the response following the collected information resulting in an efficient
and coordinated way?
6. Is the mobilizing of public health resources (mobilizing of stakeholders)
meeting the threat of the outbreak?
The efficiency in these questions is including willingness, scientific and
financial resources, and legislations. Answering of these questions might be
difficult in some cases. However, in absence of information, the conservative
pathway is to consider No as an answer. It is clear that answering these
questions will depend on subjective rather than objective measurement.
However, the limitation of this method hopefully will not limit the usefulness of
this index in majority of cases. Subjective assessment of West African public
health for Ebola outbreak would not be deviated from the realistic situation
measured by other means. It is important here to emphasize that the aim of this
index is to measure the attitude of local public health system to mitigate the
outbreak situation more than measuring the success of local public in controlling
the outbreak. A public health system having these six factors would be able to
reflect the real situation and accommodate internal and external aids to control
an emerging outbreak. The total score of this index is 1.0. The score of this index
will be calculated by dividing number of No answers by 6.
Index 10: Availability of local financial and scientific resources:
This index is assessing the ability of local health system to achieve the
best result in the outbreak’s control. In the previous two indices, the outbreak
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severity index measures the executive property of the local political system and
the tendency of local health system to have effective outbreak controlling
executive policy. However in this index, the ability of local public health system to
control an emerging outbreak is measured by assessing the potential financial
and scientific resources. Availability of resources in the presence of stable
political system and effective public health policy would indeed lead to better
result of outbreak containment. Assessment of resources availability as a
separate index indicates that this index by itself may help in correcting political
and public health policies at least partially. While in absence of financial and
scientific resources, the reform of political and public health would be more
difficult.
The assessment of financial and scientific resources is a difficult task.
Financial resources may include national Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Gross
National Product (GNP), and national income. On the other side, scientific
resources may include capacity of hospital, research activity, and availability of
high technology. The purpose of the outbreak severity index is developing a
simple and informative assessment tool. Due to difficulty of choosing an indicator
and measure it, the outbreak severity index will use the health expenditure per
capita as a surrogate indicator for the following reasons:
•

Outbreak is an emergency situation by its nature. The ability of local
public health system to fight an emerging outbreak depends on medical
infrastructures that have been built over years rather than quick
mobilization of resources.
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•

Health expenditure represents in usually the highest ability of most
countries for health. It might be true that some countries may be able to
mobilize more resources in emergency case, but it would not be true for
the vast majority of countries around the world especially countries that
doesn’t have universal healthcare converge.
The World Bank has published the health expenditure per capita per

country for the last few years [125]. Health expenditure varies from 13$ in Central
African Republic to 9,715 in Norway per capita in 2013. The index score will be
calculated by dividing the local health expenditure by the highest health
expenditure among world’s countries in the same year. The result of that division
will be deducted from the total score of the index, which is 1.0 and assigned as
the score of this index.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
The purpose of this project is to develop an objective measurement for
outbreak severity. This review concerns several novel outbreaks that occurred
several years ago and one of them (SARS) is actually a story from the past. The
intent of this severity index tool is not based on measuring the severity of
outbreak in retrospective manner, but it is based on measuring any challenging
new outbreak at the time it occurs. This project assumes that the evaluation was
performed during the first few weeks of after the detection of the three outbreaks.
This assumption is due to:
•

The actual need of evaluation is most evident at the beginning of an
outbreak than at a later time in the outbreak.

•

The difference in severity that would result from the evaluation occurring
during the early phase of an outbreak may show the need for prompt
intervention.

•

The outbreak severity index is a dynamic process and can be re-applied
later during the progression of the outbreak.

Index 1- Novelty of the disease agent:
After the first case of the novel outbreak of SARS on November 16, 2002,
the five questions of the novelty index were totally unknown until almost five
months into the outbreak when the causative agent was isolated on March 24,
2003, and believed to be a new coronavirus strain [126]. During this period,
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hundreds of cases were reported around the globe. The five questions of novelty
were unanswered. At this point of time, the novelty score would be 1 for SARS.
The exception is the mode of transmission, which was assumed to occur through
arousal exposure; although tracking the transmission path was difficult without
identifying the causative agent.
MERS was identified in a different scenario, being diagnosed in The
Netherlands after a Saudi clinical sample was sent to Europe for examination.
However, a retrospective diagnosis for another case from Jordan was performed
for a deceased patient. The MERS outbreak started by identifying the causative
agent. The diagnosis was performed by rt-PCR, No other diagnostic tool was
available [127]. On other hand, source, mode of transmission, and the incubation
period were not clear; thus the novelty score for MERS was 0.6.
The Ebola outbreak in West Africa in 2014 was preceded by more than 10
outbreaks over the last several decades. It is interesting that most of the
literatures concerning Ebola was produced in the late 1990s after an outbreak in
Central Africa. The diagnosis of Ebola occurred early in the course of the
outbreak following the death of 50 cases [128]. Despite the severity of the
disease when compared with previous outbreaks, the answers for the novelty five
questions were clear. The Novelty score for Ebola at the time of detection was
0.0.
Index 2- Fatality Rate:
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The overall case fatality rate for SARS was between 14% and 15%.
Taking 15% as more conservative rate, the severity index for the fatality rate is
15/100=0.15. However, the fatality rate was calculated after the end of outbreak.
Transparency was an important issue at the beginning of SARS outbreak in
China. The fatality rate was different for the several countries involved in this
outbreak and different based on the age of the patients. This project will consider
this rate as the best available at the time of the evaluation, which may be the
case in any similar outbreak.
The MERS fatality rate is following an up and down path with differences
occurring between countries involved in the outbreak. With the confirmation of
more cases of MERS, the fatality rate is increasing. However, WHO estimates
the overall fatality rate to be 36% [129]. 36/100 is the outbreak severity index
score for the fatality index, which results in an index of 0.36.
The Ebola fatality rate is significantly different between the three West
African countries involved. However, the overall fatality rate is 64%. It has
reached almost 90% in some countries in previous outbreaks. 64/100 is the
outbreak severity index for the fatality rate index, which results in an index of
0.64.
Index 3- Incidence rate:
The incidence rate is a dynamic index that changes during the course of
the outbreak. In this project, an arbitrary point of time will be chosen to assess it,

62	
  
	
  

	
  

chosen to be at the high point of the outbreak provided that authentic information
is available.
SARS occurred in several countries around the globe. Hong Kong will be
used as the example in this severity index evaluation since it was one of the first
affected locations outside of China and had a significant number of cases. If
China were chosen instead of Hong Kong, the denominator would not be the
total population, but the affected provincial population to avoid “over-dilution” of
incidence rate. The total cases of SARS in Hong Kong was 1755 till the end of
May 2003 [130]. The total population of Hong Kong was 6.803 millions in 2003
[131]. As proposed in this project, the total population is divided by the total
number of cases to produce the index of 0.00026.
Saudi Arabia is the country of choice to calculate the incidence rate of
MERS. The total number of cases of MERS in Saudi Arabia is 1033 in June 2015
[132]. The total population of Saudi Arabia is 30.8 million [133]. The result of
dividing total number of cases by total population produces an index of 0.000034.
Sierra Leone is the country of choice to calculate the incidence rate for
Ebola. The total number of confirmed cases of Ebola is 8692 in July 2015 [102].
The total population of Sierra Leone is 5.879 millions [134], with a resulting index
of 0.0015.
The result of these calculations makes it difficult to capture the effect of
the incidence of each outbreak in the outbreak severity index. To make the
incidence more reflective another modification will be applied by multiplying the
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result by 1000. This re-calculation of the outbreak severity index is based on
producing an index score based on an incidence of 1 per 1000 population.
However, what if the incidence of were significantly higher than 1/1000? An
outbreak with higher incidence rate will be underestimated by this modification.
However, an outbreak with a very high incidence rate is rare and other factors in
the severity index would theoretically capture other important characteristics.
Index 4- Ease of transmission:
The basic reproductive number (R0) is indicator for the ease of
transmission index. The R0 for SARS is 3, which is in consistent with direct
contact or large droplet spread of the virus [13]. By dividing the SARS R0 by 10,
the result is 0.3, which will be added to outbreak severity index for the index of
ease of transmission.
The basic reproductive number (R0) for MERS is different based on the
location of the outbreak. In Jeddah, the R0 is between 3.5 and 6.7. However, in
Riyadh, the R0 is between 2.0 and 2.8 [135]. On the other hand, other studies
suggest that the R0 of MERS is less than 1.0 [136]. Taking a conservative
approach, the average of the R0 for the two main cities will be utilized in the
calculation of this index. The average of 3.5, 6.7, 2.0, and 2.8 is 3.75. Dividing
the average R0 of 3.75 by 10 will result in an average of 0.38, which will be the
MERS score for ease of transmission in the outbreak severity index.
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The basic reproductive number (R0) for Ebola is 2.7 [73]. Dividing this R0
by 10 results in 0.27, and this result will be the score of Ebola ease of
transmission in the outbreak severity index.
Index 5- Availability of treatment:
The answers to the following four questions will be used to calculate this
index:
I.

Is there any known curative treatment?

II.

Is that treatment available in area of the outbreak?

III.

Is the isolation procedure able to control transmission?

IV.

Is that isolation procedure available at the area of outbreak?
For all of the three outbreaks, which are under evaluation in this project,

there is no curative treatment. The available treatments are trials of broadspectrum antiviral agents and interferon resulting in different rates of success.
However, no one of these treatments can be claimed to be curative. The second
question is not useful since there is no definitive treatment. West African
countries do not have the capability to utilize the available treatment modalities or
supportive measures. However, the effectiveness of supportive measures is
limited. As a result, 0.5 will be added for each outbreak in the outbreak severity
index.
For the third and fourth questions, the R0 for the three outbreaks was not
high and isolation demonstrated its effectiveness. Hong Kong and Saudi Arabia
due to their resources were able to apply effective isolation. West African
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countries on the other hand had very limited resources to apply isolation
techniques. As a result 0.25 will be added to the outbreak of Ebola since isolation
appears to be effective, but was not available in the area of outbreak.
Index 6- Geographical communication potential:
The evaluation of geographical communication potential needs to define
the starting point of the evaluator. In this project, the starting point will be the risk
of transmission of an outbreak to the USA. Hong Kong will be considered as the
high point of communication due to trade and tourism and will be assigned the
full score of 1.0. Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf States will be considered as a
high area of communication due to Hajj, trade, and educational movement.
However, West Africa will be considered as an area of low communication
potential and a score of 0.0 will be assigned for this index. This evaluation is
subjective in nature. Nevertheless, the perception of danger of disease spread is
important in this evaluation tool.
Index 7- population density:
The population density of Hong Kong was 6,690 individuals per square
kilometer in 2010, which will be utilized in considering the SARS outbreak that
occurred in 2003 and it is believed that no major change has occurred
subsequently. [137]. This high density of population will result in assigning the full
score for this index to Hong Kong in the outbreak severity index. The population
density in Saudi Arabia was 13 per square kilometer in 2013 [137], resulting in
giving MERS in Saudi Arabia a score of 0.4 for this index in the outbreak severity
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index. The population densities for Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guinea are
between 45 and 86 [133, which result in a score of 0.6 for this index in the
outbreak severity index for Ebola.
Index 8- Political stability:
The ten measures for promotion and consolidation of democracy will be
assessed for Hong Kong, Saudi Arabia, and Sierra Leone. Each No in the
following table will be assigned a score of 0.1 and the result of the ten summed
to calculate the score of this index. The final score will be added to the outbreak
severity index for the corresponding disease outbreak. Answering these
questions could be performed using information available in the public domain or
even by best judgment of the evaluation team. In this project, the score for
political rights and civil liberties published by the non-governmental organization
of Freedom House [138] will be used to answer most of the questions. Freedom
House has a specific categorization for the democracy indices. Democracy
indices are divided into two categories, the first deals with political rights and the
second with civil liberties. Also, Freedom house has a specific scoring process,
which ranges from 7 (worst) to 1 (free). Also, each index has its own scoring
point. As a general rule, any score equal to or less than half of the total score for
each index will be considered as no in the ten questions table.

1-Respect

for

human

rights

and

fundamental
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Hong

Saudi

Sierra

Kong

Arabia

Leone

NO

NO

YES

	
  

freedoms.
2-Freedom of association.

YES

NO

YES

3-Freedom of expression and opinion.

YES

NO

YES

4-Access to power and its exercise in accordance

YES

NO

YES

NO

NO

YES

NO

NO

YES

7-The separation of powers.

NO

NO

YES

8-The independence of the judiciary.

YES

NO

YES

YES

NO

YES

YES

NO

YES

0.4

1.0

0.0

with the rule of law.
5-The holding of periodic free and fair elections by
universal suffrage and by secret ballot as the
expression of the will of the people.
6-A pluralistic system of political parties and
organizations.

9-Transparency

and

accountability

in

public

administration.
10 Free, independent and pluralistic media.
Total Score of
Political stability
Table	
  1:	
  Ten	
  measures	
  of	
  political	
  stability

Index 9- Quality of local healthcare system:
It should be kept in mind that answering of the six questions to calculate
the quality of local healthcare system index might be controversial and
debatable. The evaluating team should expect some obscurity in information and
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expect to use its best judgment to determine the quality of any specific public
health system. The focus of this index should concentrate on the attitudes and
capabilities of the public health system to detect, monitor, and control the
outbreak. In the following table, this review will attempt to answer these
questions from studies and reports that have been produced following these
outbreaks [139][140][141]. However, these studies and reports are not
comprehensive and fully informative. Personal and team judgment should be
applied using the best available resources. Judgment should also be applied in
the absence of information using the best estimate such as giving the Ebola
outbreak in Sierra Leone a score of 1.0 since this country is suffering from
poverty and a limitation of healthcare services. Countries such as Saudi Arabia
and Hong Kong, which have reasonably good resources, and a moderate level of
healthcare, may be assigned a score of 0.5 in the absence of specific
information. However, this judgment score should be revised once better
information is available.

Is the local health system able to detect the infected
persons efficiently?

69	
  
	
  

Hong

Saudi

Sierra

Kong

Arabia

Leone

YES

YES

NO

	
  

Is the local health system able to verify and

YES

YES

NO

YES

YES

NO

YES

YES

NO

YES

NO

NO

YES

YES

NO

0.0

0.17

1.0

authenticate the epidemiological information?

Is the flow of information from base to head of the
outbreak team and vise versa performed in efficient
way?

Is the information passed in a reasonable time that
makes intervention efficient?
Is the response following the collected information
resulting in an efficient and coordinated way?

Is the mobilizing of public health resources (mobilizing
of stakeholders) meeting the threat of the outbreak?

Total score of quality of healthcare system =
(NO/6)
Table	
  2:	
  Six	
  measures	
  of	
  quality	
  of	
  local	
  healthcare	
  system.

Uncertainty and arbitrariness may be an issue in this index. However,
public health in West African may be considered as failing to afford reasonable
protection of the population. On the other hand, public health systems in Saudi
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Arabia and Hong Kong may be not adequate. Despite the uncertainty, the margin
of error appears reasonable.
Index 10- Availability of local financial and scientific resources:
The Hong Kong health expenditure per capita is $ 1860 in 2015 [142], and
dividing this expenditure by the highest national expenditure, Norway, ($ 9,715 in
2013) results in a ratio of 0.19. The rationale for using different expenditure years
is due to the unavailability of information. Subtracting the ratio of 0.19 from the
total score of this index yields a score of 0.81. Saudi Arabian health expenditures
were $ 808 per capita in 2013. Dividing 808 by 9715 and subtracting the result
from 1.0 results in a score of 0.92. Health expenditure in Sierra Leone was $ 96
per capita and dividing 96 by 9715 and subtracting the result from 1.0 produces a
result of 0.99.
Outbreak severity index

SARS

MERS

1-Novelty of the disease agent

1.0

0.6

0.0

2-Fatality rate

0.15

0.36

0.64

3-incidence rate

0.26

0.03

1.0

4- Easiness of transmission

0.3

0.38

0.27

5-Availability of treatment

0.5

0.5

0.5

6- Geographical communication potential

1.0

1.0

0.0

7- Population density

1.0

0.4

0.6
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Ebola

	
  

8- Political stability

0.4

1.0

0.0

9- Quality of local healthcare system

0.0

0.17

1.0

10- Availability of local financial and scientific

0.81

0.92

0.99

5.42

5.36

5.0

resources
Total Score
Table	
  3:	
  Summery	
  of	
  the	
  final	
  scores	
  of	
  Outbreak	
  Severity	
  Index.

Interpretation:
The result of the outbreak severity index shows that SARS has a score of
5.42, while MERS and Ebola score 5.36 and 5.0 respectively. These results
demonstrate that these outbreaks were almost equal in their severity. The
following table demonstrates common criteria that could be used to evaluate the
severity of such outbreaks by newspapers or other media outlets in the absence
of a structured tool such as the one proposed in this project:
Criteria

SARS

MERS

Ebola

Total number of cases

8098

956

12018

[143]

[144]

[145]

9.6 %

37%

50%

[139]

[140]

[105]

Case fatality rate

Mode of transmission

Person-to
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Person-to Person-to

	
  

Country/s been affected

person

person

person

Asia

Middle

West

(mainly)

East

Africa

Table	
  4:	
  Outbreak	
  evaluation	
  by	
  general	
  media.

This example of information that is available to the media may represent
public health practitioners’ knowledge concerning such outbreaks. The public
health activists and the decision-making groups would be struck by these data or
they may mistakenly underestimate others depending on known facts associated
with each outbreak. However, the outbreak severity index indicates that the three
outbreaks studied have almost the same severity despite the data available in
the media. However, it is interesting that although these three outbreaks have
similar outbreak severity indexes, less than 1000 individuals have died of MERS,
while Ebola has produced 12,000 confirmed deaths. The fatality rate of SARS
was less than 10%, while the fatality rate of Ebola exceeds 50%.
The essence of an outbreak severity index is to establish a
comprehensive tool that may take into account other important factors that affect
the spread of an outbreak rather than accept an out of context number. Canada
has an excellent public health system and significant financial and scientific
resources, but its SARS fatality rate was 17% [139] and was unable to improve
on the results noted by other countries affected by SARS. This reflects that
SARS was highly virulent and despite the efforts exerted in the treatment
process, the fatality rate was high. On the other hand, Ebola has a very high
fatality rate when compared to MERS, but in a country with an inadequate health
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system and limited educational resources, it has the same danger as MERS or
SARS. Funeral ceremonies for infected persons were linked to the spread of
Ebola in West Africa. This mismanagement of dead bodies would be easily
solved in developed countries. Lack of financial resources and support to contain
Ebola cases may play a key rule in this high number of cases of West Africa
rather than the virulence of disease itself. MERS seems to have less
transmissibility than SARS; however, new cases of MERS continue despite the
fact that the affected countries in the Arabian Peninsula are wealthy. The
mismanagement of the MERS outbreak makes eradication of the disease
difficult, while SARS was eradicated within a year.
Assessment of the validity and reliability of the outbreak severity index as
a public health surveillance tool is a challenge. This challenge is not only due to
the limited number of outbreaks that can be tested, but the end result of the
outbreak severity index is vague. There are many parameters for tracking a
devastating outbreak such as the number of cases, case fatality rate, mode of
transmission, as well as others. However, should one of these parameters be
selected for monitoring outbreaks, the question may be raised as to why such a
complex tool as the outbreaks severity index should be developed to measure a
simple outcome parameter. Assessment of the validity and reliability of the
outbreak severity index appears premature at this stage of its development.
Weak points of this evaluation:
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In the evaluation of SARS, MERS, and Ebola using the outbreak severity
index, certain weaknesses were encountered. These weaknesses were due to
structural, informational, and conceptual factors. It should be clear that this tool is
at an early stage of development and further trials and sharpening of the various
indexes comprising it are warranted. The weaknesses of the index include:
I. Discrepancy in time of evaluation:
SARS as one of outbreaks that was assessed in this project is an
outbreak that has been resolved for more than a decade. However, MERS and
Ebola are still a challenge for global health. Some of the information utilized in
the severity index may not be available at the beginning of an outbreak.
Retrospective evaluation of SARS may reduce the validity of the outbreak
severity index when compared with MERS and Ebola, which are still occurring.
However, the outbreak severity index is a dynamic assessment tool and should
accommodate changes.
II. Reference score:
The result of the outbreak severity index demonstrates the similarity of
these three outbreaks with a score of approximately 5 out of 10. On the other
hand, a reference point for a previous outbreak is not available for comparison.
Even historic outbreaks such as the Spanish Flu pandemic early in the 20th
century would not be applicable to this assessment tool due to the advancement
of technology and information systems and political change. Sequentially using
the outbreak severity index in future should lead to a reference point for its use.
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III. When it would work the best:
The outbreak severity index is a tool that should be utilized in the face of
the uncertainty and chaos accompanying the onset of an outbreak. It is
not primarily a tool for retrospective assessment. The severity
determination of an outbreak should be followed by procedures that
contain and prevent the spread of such an outbreak at the local, regional,
and international level. Also, the score of any of the three outbreaks that
have been reviewed in this project might be different according to the level
of information available at the beginning of each outbreak.
IV. Stakeholders’ Testimonies:
Some of the outbreaks, which were reviewed in this project, have a bulk of
literature regarding many properties of each outbreak that might not available for
an evaluating team facing a new threatening outbreak. This could limit the validity
of this review. The quality of this assessment tool may be enhanced by reviewing
the testimonies of the stakeholders who dealt with a specific outbreak. Allowing
a change in the score of the outbreak severity index when more information
becomes available may reveal its sensitivity.
V. Default scores:
Since the outbreak severity index has 10 indices, some information
concerning and outbreak may not be available to the evaluating team at
the time of assessment. The absence of information may lead to an
inappropriate evaluation. However, the default pathway in the case of
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unavailable information should be handled in a conservative manner. It is
much safer to overestimate an outbreak and be prepared accordingly than
to underestimate an outbreak. A full score of an index should be assigned
to any of the ten sub-indexes when the evaluating team has no objective
information. Also, some of outbreak severity sub-indices have a number of
questions that must be answered to reach a score for that sub-index. The
same conservative attitude should prevail.
VI. Math vs. appreciation:
The outbreak severity index has been formulated through a mathematical
approach to reach a digital score. However, this mathematical approach should
not obscure the fact that it is an objective measurement for an emergency
situation. It is based in the most part on an appreciation for a concurrent situation
utilizing the best available information. Some of this information may not be
available at the time of the emergence of an outbreak. It should be understood
that ambiguity is of the nature of emergencies. Emphasis should be applied on
updating the outbreak severity index once new data is available. Also, it should
be acceptable that an outbreak severity index score may differ from place to
place and from evaluating team to evaluating team since it measures partially the
perception of danger from the outbreak.
VII. Consensus building:
Severity index measurement tools are present in both medical and natural
disaster arenas. Pneumonia severity index, head injury severity index, and
77	
  
	
  

	
  

pancreatitis severity index are examples of medical measurement tools.
Earthquake severity index [146], and hurricane severity index [147] are example
of natural disaster measurement tools. A disease outbreak shares the same
properties of medical and natural disaster emergencies, making consensus
building a difficult task since comprehensive work of a group of professionals with
different backgrounds is required. Fortunately, the public health community is the
best place to start this process due to the wide differences in public health
professionals’ backgrounds.
The first step in developing an outbreak severity index is to propose such
an efficient and useful tool based on an academic and research process. The
process of establishing of such tool appears to be an important step in building
consensus. In this step, a single proposal is not sufficient. It needs to be followed
by other proposals to insure its usefulness and effectiveness. Examination of its
reliability and validity is required in an academic setting. Building consensus is a
lengthy process. However, public health professionals should initiate the process
of development of such a tool.
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CHAPTER 5
IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH
An outbreak severity index is a tool that is intended to evaluate disease
outbreaks in anticipation of preventing or controlling the spread of disease. This
measurement tool may be used at any given time period during the emergence
of an outbreak. The public health community requires a better tool for assessing
the severity of an outbreak and implementing that assessment in disaster
preparedness. Depending on news reports about an emerging outbreak should
not be the normal public health practice especially after it has been revealed in
various social media. The duty of public health agencies during emergencies is to
lead. The traditional definition of an outbreak does not satisfy the need for
intervening and mitigating a global outbreak. The outbreak severity index is a tool
that may motivate an appropriate response to a disease outbreak. The following
points address the steps that follow after the determination of the severity of a
disease outbreak:
1-The right of international to access the available information:
Information is a key element in fighting a disease outbreak. However,
there are many barriers that prevent the flow of information. The two main
barriers are the inability to obtain information and political unwillingness to
release such information.
Lack of the ability to gather information such as occurred in the case of
Ebola in West Africa is a major challenge. This inability occurred due to an
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inefficient public health information system and interestingly enough due to the
attitude of distrust by the local population. A conspiracy theory prevailed among
the local population affected by Ebola based on the theory that foreigners
created the disease. However, such an attitude could be alleviated by the
including of key persons in the local community in the fight against Ebola.
Inclusion of key persons in these communities would not only help in changing
attitudes of distrust, but also in changing local customs such as funeral
ceremonies.
A failure in transparency was evident in China (SARS) and Saudi Arabia
(MERS) based on a political unwillingness to inform the international community
of the disease outbreak. Some reports indicated that SARS was many fold worse
than admitted [148]. Saudi Arabia was criticized in its effort to control MERS
[149]. On other hand, the WHO was criticized for its dealing with Ebola [150]. The
WHO is a product of the contemporary international political system with all of its
pros and cons. Also, the WHO is affected by its level of funding and political
issues. Such governmental behavior should be changed and efforts should be
made to guarantee a better flow of information.
2-The right of international organizations to investigate:
Disease outbreak does not recognize political borders or national
boundaries. Rather is often undetectable as it moves around the globe that acts
as a small village during an age of easy and fast communication. During such
global outbreaks, the number of stakeholders expanded such that an outbreak
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involves every human being. SARS in Hong Kong was easily transmitted to a
North American city.
Admitting that the whole population of the world are at risk of been
infected should lead to accepting the right to know and to investigate. The reality
of the current geopolitical situation is that it is difficult to accept such a concept of
interference into national issues. However, the public health community should
exert more effort to make this kind of engagement acceptable and palatable.
Terrorism is a good example of how different political systems are willing to
cooperate. A global disease outbreak does not pose any lesser danger than
terrorism.
3- Application of the precautionary principle:
The precautionary principle should be used as an efficient way to promote
cooperation between international political and public entities. It should be clear
that an individual country would bear the responsibility of non-cooperative
behavior. Countries that elect not cooperate should face serious consequences
such as a boycott, which seem radical to propose for a country that refuses
cooperation and transparency. However, quarantine is a form of boycott and has
been used to contain outbreaks in the past. Public health/ global health
diplomacy was almost absent in these three outbreaks, a failure should not
shape the future.
4- International Preventive Task Force, sharing of costs and representation:

81	
  
	
  

	
  

Alternative approaches such as an international collaborative task force
has been shown to be highly effective in the eradication of smallpox. Building
similar collaborative task forces for fighting emergent disease outbreaks may
produce improved results. This task force should include both governmental and
public cadres, with a vision and mission to mitigate a specific international
disease outbreak. The purpose of this task force is not to undermine the work of
the WHO or other international agencies, but rather to support their efforts and to
reduce bureaucratic and political issues.
One of the main deterrents to form such a task force is its funding.
However, a disease outbreak does not solely happen in poor countries as has
been experienced in the case of SARS and MERS. Volunteers should be
encouraged to join such a task force. The other deterrent is political acceptance
of the efforts of such a task force. Preemption authority of such task force would
a source of dispute, but such disputes may be solved by fair representation on
the task force including local involvement. The establishment of such a task force
would promote international cooperation, the exchange of information, and limit
the bureaucracy inherent in a disease outbreak. It would provide a platform for
accepting funding and volunteers and serve as a distribution point to areas that
are in need of support.
5- Application of public health police power:
Public health police power such as quarantine and closed boarders and/or
boycotts should not be underestimated as a procedure for outbreak containment.
However, the actual situation may make this choice very difficult provoking a
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political response. Also, historically boycotts have been misused for unjustified
reasons. At the beginning of an outbreak, this choice would be too extreme to be
considered. Nevertheless, with an increase in the number of cases, many states
may resort to this choice.
Public health and global health professionals should initiate the discussion
regarding the regulation of the concept of an international quarantine. A preset
announcement of such a regulation would serve to legitimize this kind of
procedure. It should be fair, equitable, and supportive for countries that are
engaged in fighting a disease outbreak.
6- Sustainable intervention:
The use of the outbreak severity index should not only be a defense
mechanism against outbreak, but it should be used as a tool to direct support
and intervention in the area of the outbreak especially in areas that are
underdeveloped and under-resourced. The outbreak severity index is a tool for
evaluating the virulence of an outbreak agent and the local capabilities of fighting
the outbreak. Utilizing the outbreak severity index in a local social, political, and
demographic approach should mitigate deficiencies and scarcities in fighting the
disease outbreak.
A sustainable intervention is based on involving the local population rather
than depending only on external aid. Sustainable intervention includes
developing local community resources, education, training, and advocating. West
Africa as an example is in great need of engagement that promotes community
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resources. Building trust by engaging the local population in rebuilding of
community’s resources is a key factor for success in an atmosphere of doubt.

Conclusion:
The outbreak severity index is a measurement tool that is useful in public
health practice to justify precaution and to justify interference. The review of the
last several disease outbreaks, SARS, MERS, and Ebola, demonstrated
moderate global outbreaks. Public health needs an assessment tool for local and
global outbreaks that would direct the best international intervention. The score
of the outbreak severity index could be used for such a purpose. This
measurement tool is still in the early stages of development and more effort is
needed to make it a more useful and reliable tool.
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